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In Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in 
Belief1, Linda Zagzebski engages in a  wide-reaching investigation of 
underexplored epistemic terrain. The work is timely, given the recent 
interest of contemporary epistemologists in testimony and trust, and she 
approaches the topic from a novel angle: the rationality of beliefs taken on 
the authority of others. This accessibly written book covers an extensive 
span of topics including trust, testimony, and authority, in addition to 
the intersection of these notions with the domains of emotion, morality, 
religion, communities, and disagreement. Given the breadth of topics in 
the book, I will not be able to address all the ideas worthy of discussion. 
I will concentrate on a few topics. I will first examine the notions that 
serve as the foundation for the book: rationality, conscientiousness, and 
trust. I then raise several questions concerning her account of epistemic 
authority. Finally, I  advance a  worry regarding the application of her 
account to the problem of disagreement.
I. RATIONALITY, TRUST, AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS
A main thesis of Zagzebski’s book is that trust in oneself and in others 
is rationally inescapable. The self-reflective rationally consistent agent 
will trust others. Zagzebski takes as her opponent the epistemic egoist – 
someone who believes that her only way of gaining reasons for belief is 
to rely on her own faculties. The extreme epistemic egoist trusts only in 
herself she does not trust others (a less extreme egoist trusts others but 
only when her own faculties provide her with reasons to trust the person). 
1 Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and 
Autonomy in Belief, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
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After defending the rationality of trust in both self and others, Zagzebski 
argues that it is rational to take beliefs on the authority of others, and 
then extends her argument to include the authority of communities as 
well as moral and religious authorities.
Rationality is central to Zagzebski’s project. To be rational, she 
suggests is ‘to do a  better job of what we do in any case  – what our 
faculties do naturally’ (2012: 30). Our initial model of rationality, on 
her picture, is the resolution of the experience of dissonance or conflict 
between our mental states. Resolving dissonance is often automatic, 
but at times involves conscious deliberation. For Zagzebski, self-trust is 
rational because it resolves dissonance. More specifically, a general trust 
in one’s faculties is rational because it resolves the dissonance arising 
from the epistemic circularity objection to justified belief in the reliability 
of our faculties. Particular trust in our faculties is rational when we are 
conscientious. Zagzebski understands epistemic conscientiousness as 
the ‘quality of using our faculties to the best of our ability in order to 
get the truth’ (2012: 48). It is the state or disposition of being careful 
and doing our best. Conscientiousness comes in degrees and requires 
self-awareness and self-monitoring. It is essential to her overall account 
that we trust we will succeed more often when we are conscientious. In 
this way, conscientiousness is our second model of rationality. As we 
shall see, this notion plays a key role in Zagzebski’s defence of trusting 
epistemic authorities.
Zagzebski extends the rationality of trust in oneself to trust in others. 
Although she offers no clear set of conditions for when trust in others is 
justified, her main idea is that when we conscientiously judge that we can 
trust someone, we are rational to trust them. Zagzebski argues that if we 
are rational, we cannot fail to trust others, on pain of inconsistency. Her 
reasoning is as follows:
When I  am conscientious I  will come to believe that other normal, 
mature humans have the same natural desire for truth and the same 
general powers and capacities that I  have. If I  have a  general trust in 
myself and I accept the principle that I should treat like cases alike, I am 
rationally committed to having a general trust in them also. (2012: 55)
She takes it as given that we are all basically alike in our general abilities, 
and while she admits there are exceptions to this general similarity, she 
suggests the exceptions will be very limited. The principle of ‘treat like 
alike’ she understands as a priori.
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I worry that this reasoning will apply in far fewer cases than Zagzebski 
seems to expect. Although most people may have the same general powers 
and capacities with respect to telling the time or knowing whether it is 
raining by looking out the window, in less mundane cases our powers and 
faculties vary in initial aptitude as well as specific training. If a rational 
requirement to trust others with respect to mundane facts is all that the 
argument establishes, this severely limits the extent to which trusting 
others is rationally inescapable and thereby reduces the effectiveness of 
the argument to oppose the egoist.
Zagzebski’s reasoning leads her to affirm the following: the fact that 
another person believes p always gives me prima facie reason to believe p 
(2012: 58). At first glance this suggestion may seem suspect, but she goes 
on to explain that by ‘reason’ she does not mean a decisive reason, but 
rather one with ‘genuine weight’. The fact that another person believes p 
counts in favour of p for me, though it does not always provide enough 
weight for me to believe p. Furthermore, the weight it provides can 
be defeated – in some cases it can be defeated quite easily. Given how 
weakly the principle is intended, the reasoning strikes me as plausible. 
If not read in light of this qualification, some of Zagzebski’s statements 
about prima facie reasons could be misleading. One would be forgiven 
for thinking that she holds that one gains a sufficient reason to believe p 
when one discovers that someone believes p. In fact she doesn’t think 
this. Nevertheless, Zagzebski maintains that it is often the case that 
trusting another person provides one with a decisive reason to believe 
what they believe.
Zagzebski extends the argument for general trust in others to particular 
trust in the faculties of others. When I  discover that another person 
conscientiously believes p this provides me with a stronger prima facie 
reason to believe p (stronger than if I merely know the person believes p). 
It appears that she thinks most people exhibit conscientiousness most 
of the time and to roughly the same degree. She claims: ‘[w]hen I am 
believing conscientiously, I come to believe that many [others] are just as 
conscientious as I am when I am as conscientious as I can be.’ (2012: 57) 
She further claims that when I  am observant, ‘I  will inevitably have 
excellent evidence of the conscientiousness of others.’ (2012: 61) Here 
we find a potential dilemma: being conscientious is either pretty easy, 
such that everyone is basically conscientious most of the time, or it is 
fairly demanding. If it is easy, it will not be able to play the role in solving 
the problems Zagzebski claims it solves. Or, at least, the solution will be 
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rather thin. Trusting our conscientious judgments is Zagzebski’s advice 
for resolving various difficult epistemic situations, such as disagreement 
with those we trust. If we are generally conscientious all the time, then her 
responses to such problems will amount to the suggestion that we merely 
continue doing what we are already doing and generally always do. But 
if conscientiousness is demanding, the assumption that so many people 
exhibit it so often strikes me as unlikely. Most people do not continuously 
engage in self-reflection. We clearly do not use our faculties to the best of 
our ability all or even most of the time. But if conscientiousness is rare, 
then we won’t readily have evidence of others’ conscientiousness.
It’s worth noting that Zagzebski seems to assume that we will know 
when we are conscientious  – that when we are doing our best it will 
be evident that we are doing our best. This assumption strikes me as 
mistaken. Consider a hard-working student, eager to make good grades. 
He prepares for exams and tries to do his best, but while he often 
performs well he only sometimes does his best. It is easy to imagine 
that it is not obvious to him when he is doing his best and when he is 
not – at times he may be agnostic about his efforts until he receives his 
scores. Access to our own conscientiousness is further attenuated by our 
proneness to self-deception. When we fail we often console ourselves 
with the assurance that we did our best. The desire for this assurance 
provides a motivation to believe that we are doing our best most of the 
time. Our beliefs about our own conscientiousness are prime ground for 
self-deception.
One final issue arises in this connection. On Zagzebski’s account, 
‘our only test that a belief is true is that it survives future conscientious 
reflection’ (2012: 50). I ought to trust others when I predict their beliefs 
will satisfy my future self-reflection. In this way, being rational requires 
predicting the future in unrealistic ways. Zagzebski does not elaborate 
on how we determine which beliefs will satisfy future self-reflection, 
though she doesn’t seem to expect that we will have trouble making such 
predictions. Given that we are not usually in a position to predict what 
our future evidence will be, it’s hard to see how we could make judgments 
about future reflection with any confidence or accuracy.
II. EPISTEMIC AUTHORITIES
Zagzebski’s defence of trusting epistemic authorities is the centrepiece 
of the book. An epistemic authority, on her view, is ‘someone who does 
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what I  would do if I  were more conscientious or better than I  am at 
satisfying the aim of conscientiousness – getting the truth’ (2012: 109). 
The following principle, the Justification Thesis 2 for the Authority of 
Belief, states Zagzebski’s main idea:
(JAB2): The authority of another person’s belief for me is justified by 
my conscientious judgment that I am more likely to form a belief that 
survives conscientious self-reflection if I  believe what the authority 
believes than if I try to figure out what to believe myself. (2012: 110)
Trusting an  authority differs from merely trusting another person. 
Trusting another person provides one with a  prima facie reason to 
believe p (a  reason that merely counts in favour of p), but authorities 
provide sufficient reasons to believe p, and further, authorities provide 
pre-emptive reasons.
Before I discuss pre-emption, I want to raise one question regarding 
who counts as an epistemic authority. It’s not clear whether an epistemic 
authority must be more conscientious than me or whether someone could 
be an epistemic authority merely in virtue of having more evidence than 
me. Zagzebski’s characterization of an epistemic authority suggests that 
an authority needs to be more conscientious than myself. An authority 
has ‘more of the qualities I trust in myself insofar as I am epistemically 
conscientious’ (2012: 108); she is someone who ‘can help me to believe as 
I would believe myself, given my desires, emotions, and other beliefs ... 
’(2012: 111). Moreover, ‘the point of epistemic authority is to help me in 
believing conscientiously’ (2012: 111). In any case, these remarks indicate 
that an epistemic authority is not a general ideal, but a better version of 
yourself – when an epistemic authority is more conscientious than you, 
she must be conscientious in a way that resembles you. It seems I cannot 
rationally take someone as an epistemic authority if her psychic structure 
is incongruent with my current desires, emotions, and other beliefs. (If 
an epistemic authority must be more conscientious than myself, this sets 
a  fairly stringent constraint on who can be an  epistemic authority for 
me. Surely some of my desires and beliefs prevent me from being more 
conscientious than I am, thus the more conscientious version of me will 
lack those desires and beliefs though it’s unclear how I would recognize 
which beliefs and desires those are in advance.)
In her account of what is authoritative about an epistemic authority, 
Zagzebski draws on contemporary work in legal philosophy – the writing 
of Joseph Raz in particular. Although in the practical realm authority is 
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typically exercised through commands, Zagzebski claims that the right 
to command is not an essential feature of authority. (She does mention 
that she thinks we are psychologically able to believe on command, but 
this supposition is not part of her account.) On Zagzebski’s picture, what 
is essential to authority is that authorities generate pre-emptive reasons 
for a  subject to act or to believe something. A  pre-emptive reason is 
a ‘reason that replaces other reasons the subject has’ (2012: 102). The fact 
that an authority believes p is not simply added to one’s other reasons; 
trusting an  authority involves allowing the authority to ‘stand in’ for 
oneself. (It’s worth noting one way in which beliefs taken on epistemic 
authority differ from those based on testimony: it can be rational to 
believe p on someone’s authority merely when I know that that authority 
believes p. She does not have to tell me p; in fact, the authority does not 
even need to know that I exist.)
One concern Zagzebski raises concerning the idea of pre-emptive 
reasons is that it’s not obvious that it is psychologically possible for me 
to let an authority’s belief that p pre-empt my reasons. One might worry 
that I  can’t just ignore my other reasons. In defence of pre-emptive 
reasons, Zagzebski considers an example of a pre-emptive reason to act. 
She suggests that it is possible to stop at a red light for the reason that 
it is against the law to drive through a red light, even if one has other 
reasons for stopping, such as the likelihood of being hit. She states, ‘if 
I stop because the law says to do so, that reason has the status of being my 
reason for stopping. It can be the reason even though I am quite capable 
of reciting many reasons for and against stopping.’ (2012: 113) It appears 
that for the fact that the law requires one to stop at a red light to be my 
reason for stopping – and thus to pre-empt my other reasons – it must 
be the case that my other reasons do not play a role in motivating me to 
stop. That the law requires me to stop must be my basis for action. The 
parallel with belief is as follows: to believe p on authority the fact that the 
authority believes p must be my basis for believing.
I am sympathetic to Zagzebski’s proposal that we sometimes make 
one of our reasons our sole basis for action or belief. But I worry that 
the settings where we adopt pre-emptive reasons – and thus the settings 
where we believe on authority  – will be more limited than Zagzebski 
seems to envision. There are several reasons for this: first, because pre-
emption is not always psychologically possible. Consider again a  case 
of action. Suppose an  authority commands me to take my mother to 
lunch on her birthday – something I was already planning to do because 
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I enjoy spending time with her and want her to enjoy her birthday. It’s not 
clear that I can take her to lunch solely for the reason that the authority 
commands it – my other reasons are too strong to fail to motivate me. 
In the case of reasons for beliefs, the situation seems worse. If I already 
believe that it is wrong to steal, and have good reasons for so believing, 
I may not be able to believe solely because an authority believes it. My 
other reasons will inevitably play a role in my belief. The same will hold 
for many beliefs for which I have strong evidence.
Second, if pre-emption is essential for believing on authority, 
as Zagzebski suggests, it is not clear that it is possible to believe p on 
authority in a setting where I don’t already have some reasons to believe or 
disbelieve p. Pre-emption seems to require prior possession of reasons – 
an authority’s belief can’t replace my reasons if I don’t have any reasons 
to be replaced. (Perhaps we should understand a pre-emptive reason as 
a  reason that replaces your other reasons if you have any.) Moreover, 
Zagzebski claims that when we already have beliefs on a topic, it is less 
likely we will trust an authority, since it is less likely we will judge that the 
authority’s belief will survive our conscientious reflection. The foregoing 
considerations suggest that believing on authority will occur primarily 
in settings where either (1) I have no reasons to believe or disbelieve p, 
or, (2) I have weak reasons for or against p.
One final question regards whether pre-emption requires a kind of 
counterfactual stability. What if I let a reason pre-empt my other reasons 
but I very easily might not have? Suppose I stop at the red light because 
the law requires it, but if I had been in a hurry and no one was around 
I would have gone through the light. Is this fact relevant to the settings 
where I stop when I am not in a hurry? We can assume that when I am 
not in a hurry I believe that I am stopping because it is the law. It’s not 
clear whether what I  would do in similar cases makes a  difference to 
whether a reason counts as pre-emptive. This issue may reach beyond 
the scope of Zagzebski’s aims in this chapter, but I  raise it as an  area 
deserving further exploration.
III. CONSCIENTIOUS TRUST AND DISAGREEMENT
We’ve seen thus far that the notion of a belief that survives conscientious 
self-reflection plays a key role in Zagzebski’s discussion. This theme is 
repeated throughout the work and is the foundation of the guidance 
she offers for navigating various epistemic difficulties, such as what one 
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ought to do in the face of disagreement. Zagzebski casts the problem of 
disagreement as an intrapersonal conflict, rather than an interpersonal 
conflict. On her view, disagreement is a  problem that arises within 
self-trust because trusting myself commits me to trusting others. When 
I disagree with someone I trust, I experience conflict between my self-
trust and my trust in the other person.
The appropriate resolution to disagreement with people I take to be 
conscientious, on her picture, is to believe in accordance with whatever 
‘I  trust the most when I  am thinking in the way I  trust most, that is 
conscientiously’ (2012: 214). When we are conscientious, we are doing 
our best and that is all we can do. Zagzebski provides surprisingly little 
guidance for dealing with cases of disagreement beyond this. She does 
suggest that beliefs that are central to one’s noetic structure will often 
have survived a  great deal of self-reflection; thus, when disagreement 
involves one of these core beliefs it is unlikely that one will judge that one 
ought to trust the other person. This way of thinking seems to condone 
a  ‘stick to your guns’ mentality for at least many of our strongly held 
beliefs.
Resolution of disagreement involves prediction of what will survive 
future conscientious reflection:
Disagreement with people we conscientiously judge to be conscientious 
should be handled ... in a  way that we conscientiously judge will 
survive conscientious self-reflection. ... What is relevant for me is what 
I conscientiously believe, and what I predict will satisfy my future self-
reflection, given what I conscientiously predict about myself. (2012: 215)
We have already mentioned one difficulty for this methodology: it 
requires predicting the future. A  further question concerns what you 
ought to do if you know that you are bad at predicting what will satisfy 
your future self-reflection. Suppose you have loads of evidence that you 
are fairly unreliable at making such predictions. (Actually this strikes 
me as quite plausible, given that we often cannot predict what evidence 
will be available to us in the future and which beliefs will survive future 
self-reflection will be highly dependent on my future evidence.) Given 
what she’s said thus far, it seems likely Zagzebki’s response would be to 
do your conscientious best – that’s all you can do.
It’s a bit surprising that having dismissed the usual characterization 
of the problem of disagreement as not very interesting and failing to 
constitute a distinct evidential problem – despite the abundance of recent 
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puzzlement on the topic in the literature – Zagzebski’s central advice for 
resolving the conflict is to be conscientious and do your best (2012: 211). 
In the face of disagreement we often don’t know the best way to resolve 
the conflict and we don’t always know what the most conscientious 
response is. In this way, her discussion may strike some as insensitive to 
the nuances surrounding the problem.
CONCLUSION
Although I  agree with several of Zagzebski’s main conclusions, the 
reasoning she uses to arrive at these conclusions I find wanting in the 
ways I’ve mentioned here. By taking the egoist as her main opponent, 
Zagzebski ends up treating several complex issues with too blunt 
an instrument. Arguably, the notion of conscientiousness does too much 
work for her account given the insufficient discussion of what exactly it is 
to be conscientious. Nevertheless, she points us in the direction of topics 
worthy of discussion and has constructed a  broad framework within 
which to grapple with these questions. Any reader will find something 
of interest to mull over in this book, and it will easily become required 
reading for anyone working on the concept of epistemic authority.
